


















































































TEA – Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product. 
GEM – Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
EFI – Index of Economic Freedom 
WGI – World Governance Indicators 
WDI –World Development Indicators 
OLS – Ordinary Least Squares 
EA – Entrepreneurial Activity 
EY – Election Year 
PC – Party Change 
NTEA – Necessity Total Entrepreneurial Activity  






Purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of political elections on 
entrepreneurial activity. In order to do so, we collect data from 17 countries for a varied 
number of years (within a range of 16 to 21 years per country) to build a sample of 
3,056 observations. Our data comes from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Adult 
Population Survey and from Nordsieck, W. (1997) Parties and Elections in Europe 
retrieved from http://www.parties-and-elections.eu . We then estimate a pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and a fixed effect model to see how the elections timing 
affect entrepreneurial levels in the country. In addition, we examine the effects of an 
unexpected victory, Results obtained suggest that Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
increases during an election year and decreases the year before, while there is no 
statistical evidence of any effect in the year after.  
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O objetivo desta dissertação é examinar o impacto das eleições políticas na atividade 
empresarial. Para isso, coletamos dados de 16 países por um número variado de anos 
(dentro de uma faixa de 16 a 21 anos por país) para construir uma amostra de 3.056 
observações. Os nossos dados vêm do Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Adult 
Population Survey e do Nordsieck, W. (1997) Parties and Elections in Europe, obtido 
em http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. Em seguida, estimamos um pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) e um modelo de efeito fixo para ver como o momento das eleições 
afeta os níveis empresariais no país. Além disso, examinamos os efeitos de uma vitória 
inesperada. Os resultados obtidos sugerem que a Atividade Empreendedora Total 
aumenta durante um ano eleitoral e diminui no ano anterior, enquanto não há evidência 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the relationship between political 
uncertainty and entrepreneurial activity by measuring the change in the level of such 
activity before, during, and after election years throughout a sample of different 
countries  
While in previous literature the topic of entrepreneurship activity and its 
determinants has been widely explored, attempts to link such activity with political 
cyclicality have been scarce and produced different results. Possible reasons for this 
phenomenon can be the multiplicity of definitions of entrepreneurship, which result in 
different interpretations of its meaning and inevitably a wide range of research. 
Different definitions also result in collection of different type of data, meaning results 
which hold for a certain definition of entrepreneurship may not hold for another 
interpretation of the same phenomenon.  In this paper, we use Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM)  definition and define entrepreneurial activity as percentage of 18-64 
population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business.  
In this study, we evaluate whether political cyclicality, and more precisely election 
timing and leadership change, have an effect on entrepreneurial activity. In order to do 
so, survey-based panel data was extracted from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) survey to create a sample of 16 countries1 across a range of 16 to 21 years per 
country, using multilinear and fixed effect regression to characterize the econometric 
relation between political cycles and level of entrepreneurial activity.  
We find that total entrepreneurial activity decreases two years prior to an 
election where a leading party change occurred. We find no statistical evidence of 
entrepreneurial activity increasing after the elections took place. Nevertheless, these 
results underline how entrepreneurial activity is dependent on the political stability of a 
country, adding to the previous literature on political studies, which demonstrates how 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem may be reinforced by a controlled political environment.  
 
1 Countries in sample are: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
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The dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review; 
Section 3 explains the methodology and the data base while Section 4 explains the 
results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 




When trying to understand entrepreneurial activity, the first obstacle is related to 
the definition of entrepreneurship. Previous literature sees entrepreneurial activity 
through a variety of lenses. Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) for example when considering 
entrepreneurship and economic freedom see entrepreneurs as individuals who perceive 
new economic opportunities and introduce their specific ways of seizing these 
opportunities into the market in the face of uncertainty. Acs and Szerb (2007) similarly 
define the entrepreneur as an individual willing to assume the financial risk of 
developing a new venture based on a new idea or an innovative way to perform a task. 
Nevertheless, a common thread that ties the definitions together is the idea of discovery 
and innovation: the entrepreneur is always an individual who, whether by introducing 
new combinations of production methodologies, discovering something previously 
unknown, or undertaking new business ventures in spite of financial uncertainty, 
disrupts the previously reached economic equilibrium.  
 
2.2. Entrepreneurship and Institutional Theory 
 
When trying to define and explain the determinants of entrepreneurial activity, 
previous research refers to institutional theory. This theory tries to find a cause effect 
relationship between existing institutions and the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
Beginning point for this particular analysis is research such as Chowdhury and 
Desai (2016) who take a wide view of entrepreneurial activity and its relationship with 
institutional attributes. In particular, they analyse the relation with government size, tax 
policy and entrepreneurship. They find that larger government size does not necessarily 
coincide with greater entrepreneurial effort as this can be heavily dependent on efficient 
allocation and bureaucratic burden. Other authors take a different approach to 
understand the same issue; although tackling a similar research question, that is how 
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different institutional arrangements influence the rate and type of entrepreneurship. For 
example, Stenholm, Acs, and Weber (2010) introduce Scott’s institutional pillars to the 
research. This approach consists in grouping a multitude of institutional factors under 
four different dimensions: regulatory, which include policies and laws that affect 
individual behavior and can consequently promote or hinder entrepreneurial activity; 
cognitive, which regards the interpretation of information by individuals and their 
ability to discern and seize novel opportunities; narrative, more deeply related to social 
norms and human behavior; and conducive, which  captures how institutional 
arrangements shape the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. The authors add to this 
theory by introducing the conducive dimension in order to analyze more deeply the 
relationship between how institutional arrangements shape the quality of 
entrepreneurship in a country. 
Bylund and Mccaffrey (2017) focus on the role of institutional uncertainty; more 
specifically, the authors find that institutional uncertainty exists when entrepreneurs 
doubt the future comparability of institutions at different levels. As a consequence, the 
paper highlights different courses of actions available when being faced with such 
conditions and group them into four categories: abiding, evasive, altering and exit. 
Taking a different theoretical perspective, that is focusing on entrepreneurial reaction 
when facing uncertainty rather than directly addressing institutions and entrepreneurial 
activity, the results obtained also fall under a different scope providing new insights on 
how to distinguish between various types of entrepreneurial decision making. 
Henrekson (2005) takes a more theoretical approach by considering the cause-
effect relationship with a welfare state model. While similarities with institutional 
theory observations are present, he groups different countries under a ’welfare state’ 
model and observes whether this particular style of governmental action facilitates or 
hinders entrepreneurial activity.  
Previous research suggests that governmental presence through policy making is 
always present and always significant when regressed against entrepreneurship. 
Henrekson (2005) finds that, while a moderate presence can provide an easier 
entrepreneurial entry rate, an arguably excessive governmental intervention can 
significantly reduce entrepreneurial incentives and ultimately render the activity 
unattractive when compared with other possibilities. Focusing on the Swedish welfare 
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state example, he finds that “structure of payoffs have a negative effect on the return to 
entrepreneurial behaviour both in relative and absolute terms” (Henrekson, 2005, p. 26) 
due to the effects of taxation of entrepreneurial outcome and savings incentives which 
are encouraged to take forms that withdraw funds from entrepreneurial ventures. The 
author also concludes that other variables such as a high level of minimum standard of 
living guaranteed by the government also negatively impacts the level of necessity 
entrepreneurship.  Similar results can be seen when changing geographical perspective. 
Acs and Szerb (2007), while focusing on the United States, implement a parallel 
analysis and find comparable results as previously cited research, which mainly focused 
on European territory. The authors group the variables used in three different spheres: 
demographic characteristics, including measures relative to education; state 
demographic characteristics, such as unemployment rates, and finally state policy 
variables, such as taxation and minimum wage laws. When stating their expectations, 
they argue that unemployment rate is expected to have a positive influence on 
entrepreneurship, since less employment opportunities would give more incentives for 
individuals to start their own business, and that less involvement of the government may 
lead to a more suitable environment for creativity and entrepreneurial activity. Their 
findings support this hypothesis as they conclude that, in order to encourage economic 
growth, it is necessary to focus on creating an environment consistent with economic 
freedom. 
 
2.3. Impact of Political Institutions 
 
Other strands of research do tackle a similar problem as the one proposed in this 
study, that is the existence or not of a relationship between election timing and 
entrepreneurial entry. Dutta et al. (2012) test the effect of political stability on 
entrepreneurial rates, basing themselves on the underlying argument that political 
instability leads to greater risk and uncertainty in in contracting application of legal 
rules, structure of property rights and tax expenditures policies. The authors hypothesize 
a positive relation between the stability of political institutions and entrepreneurial 
activity, arguing that “unstable governments fail to commit credibly to policies that can 
encourage savings and thereby hamper the efficient functioning of the financial 
markets”(). Ultimately, their findings show that greater political stability, or 
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alternatively lower political risk, enhances the entry rate of firms and therefore raises 
entrepreneurial activities within a nation. Similarly, Autio and Fu (2015) tackle the 
research question of how a country’s political and economic institutions influence the 
allocation of efforts into both formal and informal entrepreneurship. They distinguish  
between formal and informal entrepreneurship, more precisely they define informal 
entrepreneurs as those who “trade legal products and services but do not apply for 
business registration or file any incorporation documents with government authorities” 
(Autio and Fu, 2015, p. 3). The authors’ main finding reveals that political and 
economic institutions have different effects when considering the typology of 
entrepreneurial effort; in particular, they prove that if institutions are lacking in quality, 
more entrepreneurs will choose not to register but may still choose to start or continue 
their activity. 
Julio and Yook (2012) also theorize that politics influences real decisions 
through the channel of uncertainty and instability; the authors do offer a different 
perspective though by introducing the inherit cyclical nature of politics, recognizing the 
real world is characterized by leaders who face limited terms and whose policies 
therefore are generally limited by the time horizon. This translates in the entrepreneurial 
world by considering that “if an election can potentially result into a bad outcome from 
a firm’s perspective, the option value of waiting to invest increases and the firm may 
rationally delay investment until some or all the political uncertainty is resolved” (Julio 
and Yook, 2012, p. 2), more specifically firms may choose to delay investments when 
fearing a negative change in macroeconomic policy, taxation, monetary policy or the 
general macroeconomic environment. The results of this analysis find that normal 
political process and the possibility of policy changes when facing elections do 
influence firm’s investment decisions, and furthermore changes in the degree of 
uncertainty lead to cycles in investment expenditures. 
Building on these results, and following Nordhaus’ political business cycle 
concept, according to which politicians stimulate aggregate demand before elections in 
order to stimulate fast economic growth and reduce unemployment, Alesina, Cohen and 
Roubini (1992) state two important points: opportunistic political cycles take the form 
of short run manipulations of policy instruments close to elections; retrospective voting 
is consistent with rational behavior, meaning the well-known tendency of voters to 
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judge the incumbent’s performance based on pre-electoral economic conditions is not 
an irrational strategy. Implication of these two statements is that “the incumbent 
government has an incentive to signal its competence by engaging in pre-electoral 
manipulation of policy instruments.” (Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, 1992, p. 8) 
Expectations when posing this question lean towards level of entrepreneurial activity 
decreasing before an election year as a response to an uncertain environment followed 
by an increase once this uncertainty is perceived to be removed. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
 Our dataset comes from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset, in particular 
their Adult Population Survey. The Adult Population Survey is a comprehensive 
questionnaire, administered to a minimum of 2000 adults in each country, designed to 
collect detailed information on the entrepreneurial activity, attitudes and aspirations of 
respondents. The GEM dataset provides survey-based data. According to Desai (2017), 
the advantage of using this type of data is to find a comparable and somewhat 
standardized measure of entrepreneurship across countries. Arguably, some measures 
may overestimate the actual level of entrepreneurial activity present in a country, but it 
still provides a picture of real entrepreneurial potential since it includes people who are 
already engaging in early phases of the entrepreneurial process. While the data present 
other advantages, that is for example it does not require a distinction between formal 
and informal entrepreneurship, the voluntary nature of this questionnaire and the 
relatively young age of the GEM dataset, given that the first observations available are 
from 1999 and include a reduced set of countries, pose some limitations to the research. 
Nevertheless, a wide range of research has spawned from the availability of this 
particular dataset.  
Data regarding elections was taken from Parties and Elections in Europe, a 
website that catalogs all election characteristic across Europe since 1945.  
In the end our sample is composed of 16 countries across a range of 16 to 21 
years per country, which amount at 3,056 observations. Control variables were retrieved 
from the Index of Economic Freedom, World Governance Indicator and World 
Development Indicator databases. For each country-year pair, we observe government 
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spending characteristics, levels of corruption, the amount of domestic credit to private 
sector by banks as well as unemployment and GDP per capita. 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables in the estimation, 
including a brief description, their source, and values for mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Description  Source Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
TEA Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity, measured as  
percentage of 18-64 
population who are 
either a nascent 
entrepreneur or owner-
manager of a new 
business 
GEM 6.17 2.05 1.40 12.40 
Election Year Dummy variable, 
equals 1 if there was 
an election during the 
year, 0 otherwise 





0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Election Year Change Party Dummy variable, 
equals 1 if there was 
an election during the 
year and the leading 







0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Government Spending Government spending 
/GDP 
EFI 47.03 6.55 27.45 57.74 
Corruption Perception of the 
extent to which public 
power is exercised for 
private gain. Score 
ranges from -2.5 to 
2.5; reversed order 
multiplying by -1 (-2.5 
= least corrupt; 2.5 = 
most corrupt) 
WGI -1.44 0.79 -2.47 0.19 
Domestic credit to  
private sectors 
Financial resources 
provided to the  




except central banks) 
WDI 99.86 41.00 2.29 201.26 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product 
 divided by midyear 
population. Taken in 
US Dollars 
WDI 10.59 0.49 9.30 11.42 
Unemployment Share of labor force 
that is without work 
but available for and 
seeking employment 
(% of total labor force) 
WDI 8.41 4.66 2.12 27.47 
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TEA for the majority of the countries in the sample exhibits a decrease in the 
years following 2008 followed by an increase after 2012-2013. While this common 
behavior is attributable to the global economic crisis, it is interesting to note how the 
peak levels of entrepreneurial activity throughout the sample manifested itself in the 
years successive to this crisis.  
 
Interestingly, when looking at the average of total entrepreneurial activity, the values of 
countries which successfully adopt a welfare-type governmental structure do not deviate 
significantly from the average of the sample. Particularly, using Hendrekson, (2005) 
definition of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands as “the most extensive 
welfare states” (p. 22), we find a mean value of TEA to be 5.03%, 5.74%, 7.55% and 
7.49% respectively.  
Interpretation of the election year and election year change party indicators is not as 
straightforward due to the nature of the variables themselves. Notable features are the 
lower mean and standard deviation of the interaction term, which demonstrate how 
throughout the sample election years with a change in the leading role are not as 
common as the subsistence of the previous leadership. 
Figure 1 shows the last election year for all countries in the sample, where the straight 
line is used to represent the dummy variable Election Year. 
 




























Belgium TEA Election Year
Election Year TEA
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Figure 1: continued 
 
 
Visually, there is no common pattern identifiable within the sample. While countries 
such as France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Norway exhibit a decrease in TEA the 
year before the election, other countries like Denmark, Finland, Germany and Ireland 
experience an increase in entrepreneurial activity before elections. 
The same can be said for the year after elections: Belgium, Croatia and Sweden 
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As previously mentioned, government spending has been included as a proxy for 
entrepreneurial levels in previous research. It presents a mean value of 47.03% with a 
standard deviation of 6.55% throughout the sample. 
Regarding corruption, it is interesting to observe how the mean value is negative and the 
maximum value reached by this variable is only slightly superior to zero. When 
recalling the construction of this variable, the interpretation of the values collected is an 
overall low level of corruption within the sample. Though this could ultimately 
represent an accurate depiction of reality, it is important to remember that, in this 
research, corruption is defined based on perception, meaning it could suffer some home-
country bias. 
Domestic credit to private sector was used to capture the dimension of financing new 
business venture. The decreasing trend in this value, common to all the sample, is 
attributable to the increasing popularity of new financing methodologies, such as online 
crowdfunding, which are slowly substituting the financing role generally attributable to 
banking institutions. 
Lastly, GDP per capita and unemployment offer some space for interpretation. While 
the GDP variable appears to have very little variability, as highlighted by the low 
standard deviation, the opposite can be said for unemployment levels. The latter suffers 
from an increase post-2008 in all countries, however the large gap between minimum 
and maximum values is attributable mainly to two countries: Greece and Spain, which 
respectively average to 16.47 and 15.87. Low variability of GDP per capita is somewhat 
expected, as these values aim to capture macroeconomic tendencies which, arguably, 
can be difficult to capture in a limited number of years. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
 
 
Our identification strategy pursues two objectives: first, we want to identify how 
entrepreneurial activity might change according to political activity and more precisely 
elections. To do so we lay down a pooled OLS regression with i indexing countries and 
t indexing years such that: 
 
𝐸𝐴!" = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝐸𝑌!" + 𝑋′!"#$𝜆	 + 𝜀!"  (1) 




Where i denotes the country and t denotes the year. 
 
EA is the dependent variable and captures the level of entrepreneurial activity. 
More specifically we include the Total Entrepreneurial Activity, defined as the 
percentage of 18-64 population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager 
of a new business.  
Our variable of interest is EY, a dummy capturing the fact that year t is an 
election year in country i. X is a vector of controls for country i at year t-1, to minimize 
reverse causality. The vector X mainly follows the approach taken by the previous 
studies. We include a control variable for corruption. This variable is taken from the 
World Governance Indicator and reflects the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain. The decision to control for corruption was taken as it can increase 
financial costs for new businesses by including additional expenditures which were 
previously not predicted due to their nature and can also redirect funds away from 
otherwise productive investment decision-making. The relevance of this variable is due 
to the fact that it has a greater impact on new firms more than on already established 
ones, since the former most likely have not developed yet a sufficient level of 
networking or know-how which could foster an adaptation process, meaning it could 
also play a vital role in their survival. Government spending as a percentage of GDP 
was also included as a control variable in the analysis. The variable was taken from the 
Economic Freedom Index and may capture different effects on entrepreneurial activity: 
on one hand, greater government expenditure, if efficiently allocated, could result in 
better inputs and conditions deemed favorable for entrepreneurial activity and therefore 
create an incentive for the levels of this activity to rise; on the other hand, greater 
stability introduced by welfare programs, as debated by Henrekson (2005), could reduce 
the willingness to undertake the risks associated with entrepreneurial activity 
Furthermore, controlling for the amount of domestic credit supplied by banks to the 
private sectors was done with the objective to capture one dimension of the availability 
of credit for entrepreneurial activity. The variable of unemployment is constructed 
based on the share of labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment, as taken from the World Development Indicator. The reasoning behind the 
inclusion of this variable is because unemployment can act as a motivational factor for 
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some individuals to seek new opportunities through entrepreneurial activity. Finally, 
following Bjørnskov and Foss (2008), including GDP per capita was done to control for 
potentially important effects of overall economic development. 
 
Because we have panel data, we are able to use a fixed effect analysis 
 
 𝐸𝐴!" = 𝛽%𝐸𝑌!" + 𝑋′!"#$𝜆	 + 𝑎! + 𝛿" + 𝜀!" (2) 
 
The fixed effect model identifies those variables which are time-invariant and 
replaces them with the term 𝛼!, which represents a unique value for each individual or 
unit in the panel. The term 𝛼! is the fixed-effect term related to countries unobservable 
characteristics: it represents the time-invariant characteristics of country i which are 
impossible to measure. The model also adds one more term, 	𝛿", which is a time specific 
intercept: it captures differences in the outcome Y which vary across time periods but 
not across individuals. When applying this model and all other models that leverage a 
fixed effect methodology, the errors are clustered at a country level. 
 
 
It is important to note that elections might have a lagged or a lead impact due to the 
added risk brought by electoral uncertainty. For example, entrepreneurial activity may 
decrease in the year previous to elections as entrepreneurs likely hesitate and either 
postpone their business decision or overall undertake an exit strategy if the uncertainty 
is deemed to be too high. This effect should then reverse once the uncertainty is 
resolved. To evaluate this issue, we include several dummies capturing 2 years before 
and after the election year were included, such that: 
 
𝐸𝐴!" = 𝛽$ + ∑ 𝛿&𝐸𝑌!"'&&('$&(#$ + 𝑋′!"#$𝜆	 + 𝜀!"   (3) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑌!"#& is a dummy that captures the situation m year before the election taking 
place in country i at date t.  We extend equation (3) to include fixed effect and the 
interaction term election year x change party. 
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Finally, we provide a final model capturing the effect of election year, changing party, 
and whether such effect changes with time elapsed before and after election in equation 
(v), accounting for year and country fixed effects. 
 
	𝐸𝐴!" = 𝛽$ + ∑ 𝛿&𝐸𝑌!"'&&('$&(#$ + ∑ 𝛾&𝐸𝑌!"'& × 𝑃𝐶!"'&&('$&(#$ +
𝑋′!"#$𝜆	 + 𝑎! + 𝛿" + 𝜀!"                                                      (4) 
 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
First step taken was to model an OLS regression and fixed-effects model using all 
variables previously listed.  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TEA TEA 
   
EY 0.0556 0.0556 
 (0.249) (0.117) 
Government Spending -0.128*** -0.0378 
 (0.0183) (0.0436) 
Corruption -0.201 0.453 
 (0.264) (0.944) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.00511 0.00422 
 (0.00330) (0.00617) 
GDP per Capita -0.335 7.077* 
 (0.379) (3.591) 
Unemployment -0.0289 -0.0382 
 (0.0318) (0.0735) 
Constant 16.30***  
 (4.025)  
   
Time Fixed effect No Yes 
Country Fixed effect No Yes 
Observations 278 278 
R-squared 0.175 0.647 
Adj. R-squared 0.157 0.587 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2: Model 1 
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Table 2 shows the results when using pooled OLS estimation and the fixed-effect 
model. In both models, the term election year is positive and non-significant. 
Government spending is negative and significant when using a linear estimation, 
meaning there is a decrease in TEA when government spending levels rise, but loses 
significance with the fixed-effect model. Interestingly, corruption is positively related 
with TEA in the fixed-effect model, along with the domestic credit and GDP per capita 
controls, though only the latter exhibits statistical significance. Lastly, unemployment is 
non-significant and negative in both linear and fixed-effect estimation. 
Next, we lag and lead one year the election year dummy variable; results are displayed 
in Table 3 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TEA TEA 
   
EY 0.167 0.0487 
 (0.283) (0.177) 
EY-1 0.136 -0.0565 
 (0.278) (0.146) 
EY+1 0.351 0.0986 
 (0.276) (0.210) 
Government Spending -0.125*** -0.0333 
 (0.0184) (0.0448) 
Corruption -0.158 0.518 
 (0.266) (0.910) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.00468 0.00581 
 (0.00336) (0.00664) 
GDP per Capita -0.301 7.377* 
 (0.380) (3.596) 
Unemployment -0.0312 -0.0408 
 (0.0319) (0.0719) 
Constant 15.68***  
 (4.056)  
   
Time Fixed effect No Yes 
Country Fixed effect No Yes 
Observations 276 276 
R-squared 0.175 0.647 
Adj. R-squared 1.151 0.584 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Model 2 




When observing the values of the lagged and lead terms, we see that by using the fixed-
effects model the EY-1 term is negatively related to TEA and the EY+1 is positively 
related. This would confirm what we hypothesized in this dissertation, however neither 
of these terms are statistically significant. Control variables exhibit largely the same 
behaviour as in Table 1, with government spending negative and significant in the OLS 
estimation and GDP per capita positive and significant in the fixed-effect models. 
We then add the interaction term change party, dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the election year ended with a change in the leading party and 0 otherwise. 
Objective is to capture whether the added uncertainty resulting from a new political 
leadership influences entrepreneurial activity. 
Results are displayed in Table 4: 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TEA TEA 
   
EY 0.262 0.0941 
 (0.304) (0.125) 
EY * PC -0.527 -0.0993 
 (0.447) (0.280) 
Government Spending -0.127*** -0.0375 
 (0.0183) (0.0436) 
Corruption -0.175 0.461 
 (0.265) (0.949) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.00524 0.00427 
 (0.00330) (0.00616) 
GDP per Capita -0.315 7.096* 
 (0.379) (3.579) 
Unemployment -0.0254 -0.0377 
 (0.0319) (0.0738) 
Constant 16.06***  
 (4.028)  
   
Time Fixed effect No Yes 
Country Fixed effect No Yes 
Observations 278 278 
R-squared 0.179 0.647 
Adj. R-squared 0.158 0.585 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Model 3 




Notably, both in the linear and fixed effects estimation election year is positively related 
with TEA while election year change party is negatively related, meaning 
entrepreneurial activity does actually suffer from the increase in uncertainty as a result 
of new political leadership. It is important to note however that both terms are not 
statistically significant in the estimation. Once more we see how GDP per capita is 
significant using fixed-effects and government spending using linear estimation. The 
other controls do not exhibit any extremely different behaviour than in previous 
estimations: observing the unemployment term, for example, we can see how in all 
three estimations presented this far it has been negatively related with the dependent 
variable, meaning an increase in unemployment levels is harmful to overall 
entrepreneurial activity levels, and statistically non-significant. 
Fourth step is to lag and lead one year both election year and the election year change 
party term; results are displayed in Table 5: 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TEA TEA 
   
EY 0.366 0.0772 
 (0.333) (0.172) 
EY-1 0.267 -0.0612 
 (0.334) (0.217) 
EY+1 0.474 0.154 
 (0.323) (0.200) 
EY * PC -0.536 -0.157 
 (0.453) (0.361) 
EY * PC-1 -0.402 -0.0683 
 (0.450) (0.421) 
EY * PC+1 -0.308 -0.202 
 (0.452) (0.381) 
Government Spending -0.123*** -0.0405 
 (0.0185) (0.0498) 
Corruption -0.102 0.474 
 (0.269) (0.930) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.00500 0.00541 
 (0.00337) (0.00613) 
GDP per Capita -0.269 8.207** 
 (0.381) (2.948) 
Unemployment -0.0245  
 (0.0322)  
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Constant 15.30***  
 (4.068)  
 

















Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Model 4 
 
The lagged and lead terms of election year once again show how entrepreneurial 
activity decreases the year before an election and increases the year after, although they 
are also non-significant in this estimation. The same can be said for the lagged election 
year change party interaction term, however the lead term is also negative, meaning 
entrepreneurial activity continues to decrease even after the elections if there is a new 
party in charge, possibly due to the added risk faced when such an event occurs. 
Finally, we add a new variable named uncertainty to the estimation using data from 
Nordsieck, W. (1997) Parties and Elections in Europe retrieved from 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu. To construct this variable, first we multiply the 
percentage gap between winner and runner-up of the election by the turnout. This 
results in an average value of 4.76%. We then create a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the winning party won with less that 4.76% margin and 0 otherwise. The 
goal is to capture the added level of uncertainty when the political win is perceived to be 
unexpected. 
Results for this estimation are displayed in Table 6: 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES TEA TEA 
   
EY 0.371 0.0832 
 (0.335) (0.176) 
EY-1 0.271 -0.0604 
 (0.335) (0.196) 
EY+1 0.483 0.168 
 (0.325) (0.216) 
EY * PC -0.519 0.0917 
 (0.571) (0.317) 
EY * PC-1 -0.180 0.358 
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 (0.573) (0.374) 
EY * PC+1 -0.497 0.102 
 (0.571) (0.370) 
Uncertainty -0.0300 -0.446 
 (0.695) (0.649) 
Uncertainty-1 -0.418 -0.804* 
 (0.693) (0.439) 
Uncertainty+1 0.374 -0.566 
 (0.693) (0.643) 
Government Spending -0.123*** -0.0343 
 (0.0187) (0.0435) 
Corruption -0.102 0.507 
 (0.272) (0.917) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.00497 0.00669 
 (0.00339) (0.00632) 
GDP per Capita -0.285 7.675* 
 (0.384) (3.652) 
Unemployment -0.0259 -0.0312 
 (0.0324) (0.0717) 
Constant 15.47***  
 (4.093)  
   
Time Fixed effect 





Observations 276 276 
R-squared 





 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Model 5 
 
Interestingly, the lead election year change party interaction term, though still non-
significant, changes sign when including the uncertainty term: EYCP+1 is now 
positively related with TEA, exhibiting the same behaviour as the election year term. 
While the uncertainty and uncertainty+1 term are both non-significant, the lagged 
version of the term is significant at a 10% level. Ultimately, this signifies that when 
there is an unexpected winner of an election, TEA levels are negatively affected the 
year before such election takes place. 
 
To perform a robustness check, we substitute Total Entrepreneurial Activity for 
Necessity Total Entrepreneurial Activity (NTEA) and Opportunity Total 
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Entrepreneurial Activity (OTEA). It is important to mention that these variables were 
only introduced in the GEM dataset as of 2001 and therefore some country-year pairs2 
analysed when estimating TEA were lost when estimating the following models. 
Both variables are taken from the GEM database; in particular, NTEA is defined as the 
percentage of TEA which is driven by necessity motives, and OTEA as the percentage 
of TEA which is driven by opportunity motives. 
Results for OTEA, displayed in Table 7, show how both using linear and fixed-effects 
methodology the explanatory variable does not show any statistical significance, 
however we find that the lead term of election year is now negatively related with TEA, 
while the lagged term is negatively related, subverting what was previously shown in all 
estimations where this term was present. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OTEA OTEA 
   
EY 0.188 -0.002 
 (0.274) (0.182) 
EY-1 0.203 0.087 
 (0.228) (0.18) 
EY+1 0.127 -0.016 
 (0.229) (0.13) 
EY * PC -0.175 0.175 
 (0.371) (0.267) 
Government Spending -0.085*** -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.037) 
Corruption -0.041 0.459 
 (0.220) (0.880) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.002 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
GDP per Capita 0.445 5.984** 
 (0.381) (2.08) 
Unemployment -0.046* -0.081 
 (0.026) (0.052) 
Constant 4.496  
 (3.354)  
   
Time Fixed effect No Yes 
Country Fixed effect No Yes 
Observations 275 275 
 
2 Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom for the years 1999-200; Belgium, Norway, 
Spain and Sweden for the year 2000 
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R-squared 0.199 0.621 
Adj. R-squared 0.172 0.552 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7: Model 6 
 
When looking at results for NTEA, shown in Table 8, we find more variables to be 
significant in both models: 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES NTEA NTEA 
   
EY 0.141 0.125* 
 (0.136) (0.068) 
EY-1 0.251** 0.176*** 
 (0.113) (0.058) 
EY+1 0.038 -0.016 
 (0.113) (0.036) 
EY * PC -0.203 -0.253* 
 (0.184) (0.138) 
Government Spending -0.049*** 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.012) 
Corruption -0.017 0.132 
 (0.109) (0.218) 
Credit to Private Sector -0.007*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
GDP per Capita -0.637*** 2.236** 
 (0.156) (0.858) 
Unemployment 0.031** 0.02 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
Constant 10.504  
 (1.659)  
   
Time Fixed effect No Yes 
Country Fixed effect No Yes 
Observations 275 275 
R-squared 0.389 0.776 
Adj. R-squared 0.369 0.735 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 8: Model 7 
 
In the OLS estimation, while election year and election year + 1 are both positive and 
non-significant, election year-1 is positive and significant at a 5% level, underlining 
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how the year before a political election takes place, the percentage of Total 
Entrepreneurial activity driven by necessity increases. As for previous linear models, 
government spending is negative and significant. In addition, also Credit to Private 
Sector, GDP per capita and unemployment are negative and significant. This is because 
a reduction in availability of credit, overall macroeconomic condition and 
unemployment rate have the effect of creating a “push” towards entrepreneurial activity. 
When observing the fixed-effect model, we find election year to be positive and 
significant, along with election year-1 and EECP. Of the control variables, only GDP 
per capita is significant in both estimations, although it is negatively related with NTEA 




This dissertation uses a sample of 3056 observations spanned across 16 countries within 
a range of 16 to 21 years per country to examine the relationship between Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity and political uncertainty as measured by the presence of an 
election during the year and whether that election resulted in a change at a leadership 
level. 
After gathering the sample, we estimate an OLS linear regression to capture the effects 
of the variable EY on total entrepreneurial activity and find no statistical confirmation 
of such a relationship. 
Next, we lag and lead one year the EY variable to see if the effects of political 
uncertainty are felt before or after the elections and once more find no evidence when 
using a linear estimation. 
Third step is to apply a fixed-effect model clustering the error at the country level in 
order to see whether by removing the errors tied to the country we find evidence of 
statistical dependance. 
Subsequently, we add the interaction term EY*PC to capture the additional effect of a 
party change in the election year and lag and lead one year the variable to test whether a 
new leading party would increase the level of uncertainty perceived by entrepreneurs  
Finally, we add the uncertainty term to capture if the leading party one with a large 
margin on the runner-up or if the election was close and perform a robustness check 
using necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship. 
ANDREA GALLINA  ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ELECTION TIMING 
30 
 
Findings show how entrepreneurial activity is negatively affected by the uncertainty 
term lagged one year, therefore proving how political uncertainty does impact 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Furthermore, when looking at necessity entrepreneurship we find that its levels reduce 
in the year before an election and increase during the election year. Interestingly, when 
there is a change in the leading party, necessity entrepreneurship no longer increases 
during the election year but instead decreases in levels. 
These findings partially confirm our initial hypothesis: TEA does decrease in the years 
prior to an election but however there is no statistical evidence of a rise in the years post 
elections. 
For the purposes of future research, it would be interesting to analyze if and how the 
relationship changes when the new political ideology is diametrically opposite to the 
previous one, for example when a political party whose policies are viewed as 
entrepreneurial-friendly gets succeeded by a political party whose ideology is opposite. 
Some limitations to this research remain as, though within the sample the election term 
is that of four years, in the real world this regularity is not necessarily present. As an 
example, countries such as the Netherlands and Croatia held successive election in 2002 
and 2003 and in 2015 and 2016 respectively. This lack of consistent patterns in election 
timing could undoubtably influence the results obtained within the estimation. 
Furthermore, though the nature of the data allows to easily capture both the formal and 
informal aspect of entrepreneurial activity, it is accompanied by some shortcomings 
such as the consistent availability throughout one country, along with the relatively 
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